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Missouri Human Rights Act
A Conflict of Balances:
The Adjudication of Missouri
Human Rights Act Claims
in Federal Court
PaulD. Seyferth*
Joseph H. Knittig**
I. INTRODUCTION
Peggy Kimzey sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. under Title VII' and the Missouri
Human Rights Act (MHRA)2 for subjecting her to a sexually hostile work
environment. 3 A Title VII claimant may seek compensatory and punitive
damages4 and is entitled to a jury trial on such claims, 5 but cannot recover
compensatory and punitive damages exceeding $300,000.6 The MHRA, on the
other hand, provides for "uncapped" compensatory and punitive damages, but

* Partner at Husch & Eppenberger, L.L.C., Kansas City, Missouri; B.A. 1984,
Michigan State University; J.D. 1987, University of Michigan. Mr. Seyferth practices
labor and employment law.
** Associate at Husch & Eppenberger, L.L.C., Kansas City, Missouri; Member,
Missouri Law Review, 1995-96; B.A. 1993, Culver-Stockton College; J.D. 1996,
University of Missouri-Columbia. Mr. Knittig practices labor and employment law and
general civil litigation.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) [hereinafter Title VII].
2. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.137 (1996) [hereinafter MHRA].
3. Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(c) (1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). The cap on compensatory and punitive
damages depends on the size of the employer. Potential damages against an employer
who has more than 14 but less than 101 employees for each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year are capped at $50,000. 42 U.S.C. §
198 1a(b)(3)(A) (1994). Potential damages against an employer who has more than 100
but less than 201 employees for each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year are capped at $100,000. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3)(B) (1994).
Potential damages against an employer who has more than 200 but less than 501
employees for each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year are capped at $200,000. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3)(C) (1994). Potential damages
against an employer who has more than 500 employees for each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year are capped at $300,000. 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3)(D) (1994).
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not a jury trial.7 Nonetheless, a jury awarded Kimzey $50,000,000 in punitive
damages on her MHRA claim.8 How did this happen? The fundamental
conclusion of this Article is that this anomaly clearly was not anticipated when
the Missouri General Assembly provided for uncapped damages, and the
General Assembly should consider amending the MHRA to prevent this
anomaly from happening again.
The MHRA is a heavy presence in most employment discrimination
lawsuits brought in Missouri. Unlike other state statutory schemes enacted to
provide equal employment opportunity,9 the MHRA provides substantial
protections to employees that, in several instances, exceed the scope of parallel
federal laws.'0 The purpose of this Article is to explore perhaps the most
significant such aspect of the MHRA, its provision for uncapped damages, and
the adjudication of MIHRA claims in state and federal courts.
Part II of this Article describes the evolution of uncapped damages under
the MHRA, including the Missouri General Assembly's requirement that a
judge, not ajury, determine MHRA liability." Part III of this Article illustrates
how plaintiffs use the federal courts to allow juries to award uncapped damages
under the MHRA, contrary to the inherent balance struck by the legislature in
passing the MHRA.'2 Part IV of this Article proposes a legislative solution to
this current imbalance: mandatory administrative adjudication of MHRA
claims. 3 Because the Missouri General Assembly can create rights under the
MHRA, it also should take the responsibility for ensuring that those rights are
enforced by plaintiffs on a consistent (i.e., balanced) basis, without regard to
whether MHRA plaintiffs happen to file their claims in state or federal courts.
Although the Missouri General Assembly may not eliminate or narrow the
scope of the right to a jury trial under federal law, it may narrow the manner in
which the rights it has created are enforced.' 4 By requiring MHRA claims to be

7. Mo. REV. STAT. §213.111.2 (Supp. 1997). See infra note 18 and accompanying
text.
8. Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 570 (8th. Cir. 1997). While the
trial court in Kimzey reduced the punitive damages award to $5,000,000 and the appellate
court further reduced the award to $300,000, it is of critical importance to this Article that
ajury was allowed to assess uncapped punitive damages under the MHRA, and assessed
$50,000,000. See id. at 576-78 (reducing punitive damages awarded to Kimzey).
9. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001-44-1044 (1993).
10. For example, while Title VII applies to employers of 15 or more employees,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994), the MHRA applies to employers of six or more employees.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.010(6) (Supp. 1997).
11. See infra notes 15-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 67-101 and accompanying text.
14. See State ex rel. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights v. Lasky, 622 S.W.2d
762, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the Missouri General Assembly was free to
grant, and then take away, statutory rights).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/2
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administratively adjudicated, the Missouri General Assembly can restore the
MHRA's delicate balance between uncapped damages and the right to a jury
trial.

II. THE BALANCE STRUCK BY THE MIMA
A. Overview
The M}RA prohibits discrimination in housing, employment, or public
accommodations on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
ancestry, age, or handicap.' s
This Article focuses on employment
discrimination, and more specifically, an employee's ability to sue an employer
for discrimination under the MHRA.' 6 Section 213.111 of the MHRA, which
dictates when and where an aggrieved employee may sue an employer, and the
remedies available to the employee, is a critical provision of the MHRA. This
portion of the Article highlights the balance struck by the Missouri General
Assembly in Section 213.111 when it empowered circuit or associate circuit
courts in Missouri, not juries, with the discretion
to award uncapped damages in
7
an employment discrimination lawsuit.'
B. The "Balance"Inherent in Section 213.111
There is a balance inherent in the employment provisions of the MHRA:
MHRA plaintiffs may be entitled to recover unlimited compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional discrimination, but only experienced fact
finders (i.e., judges) may award such damages. This balance is evident from the
plain language of Section 213.111 of the MHRA, which states, in its entirety:
I. If, after one hundred eighty days from the filing of a complaint alleging
an unlawful discriminatory practice, the commission has not completed its
administrative processing and the person aggrieved so requests in writing, the
commission shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter
indicating his right to bring a civil action within ninety days of such notice
against the respondent named in the complaint. Such an action may be
brought in any circuit court in any county in which the unlawful

15. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010-213.137 (1994).
16. This Article does not address the technical exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirements for an employment discrimination lawsuit, nor existing
administrative remedies available to aggrieved employees under the MHRA. For a
thorough discussion of these topics, see SANDRA L. SCHERMARHORN & WILLIAM C.
MARTUCCI, 2 Mo. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 12-1-12-17 (2d ed. 1990).
17. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111 (1994). For a more detailed analysis of the
plain language and judicial interpretations of this section of the MHRA, see infra notes
18-47 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred, either before a circuitor
associatecircuitjudge. Upon issuance of this notice, the commission shall
terminate all proceedings relating to the complaint. No person may file or
reinstate a complaint with the commission after the issuance of a notice under
this section relating to the same practice or act. Any action brought in court
under this section shall be filed within ninety days from the date of the
commission's notification letter to the individual but no later than two years
after the alleged cause occurred or its reasonable discovery by the alleged
injured party.
2. The courtmay grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or
temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may
award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, and may award court costs
and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, other than a state agency
or commission or a local commission; except that, a prevailing respondent
may be awarded court costs and reasonable attomey fees only upon a showing
that the case is without foundation."

1. No Right to a Jury Trial Under the MHRA:
State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeney
Missouri law requires courts to "give effect to [statutes] as [they are]
written."' 9 The MiRA plainly states that employees who have appropriately
exhausted their administrative remedies may sue their employers "in any circuit
court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to
have occurred.... "20 The MHRA does not say that aggrieved employees may
sue in any court, state or federal. Federal trial courts are district courts, not
"circuit courts," and many counties in the state of Missouri do not have federal
district courts present within them.2' The MHRA plainly States that aggrieved
employees are to bring their claims "either before a circuit or associate circuit

18. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111 (1994) (emphasis added).
19. Oberg v. American Recreational Products, 916 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.111.1 (1994) (emphasis added).
21. The amendments to the MHRA are particularly noteworthy regarding this issue
of "circuit court" jurisdiction within particular counties. When the legislature amends
a statute such as the MHRA, it is presumed to have intended the charge to have some
effect. Holt v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 685 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
The legislative amendments to the MI-RA demonstrate that the Missouri General
Assembly intended for civil actions to be tried in a particular county. For instance, in
1986, Senate Bill No. 513 repealed Missouri Revised Statute Section 213.127 and
replaced it with Section 213.110. This change replaced language in (then) Missouri
Revised Statute Section 213.127 stating that MHRA actions could be brought "in any
circuit in this state. . . " to the circuit courts in the county "in which the unlawful
discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred." Mo. REV. STAT. § 231.110 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/2
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judge.' ' 2 The MHRA does not say that aggrieved employees may present their
MHRA claims to a jury. Finally, the MHRA plainly states that "the court"
grants relief to the aggrieved party.23 The MHRA does not say that either the
court, or ajury, may grant the relief contemplated by the MHRA. The plain
language of Section 213.111 of the MIIHRA reveals that the Missouri General
Assembly never intended that MHRA claims would be adjudicated by federal
juries, or, for that matter, juries of any kind.
Consistent with the plain language of the MHRA, Missouri's appellate
courts determined that the Missouri General Assembly did not intend for MHRA
plaintiffs to have a right to jury trial on their MHRA claims.24 The leading case
is State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeny 2 In Tolbert,the plaintiff demanded ajury trial
on an MHRA age discrimination claim, and the trial judge indicated that he
intended to strike the jury demand because the plaintiff had no right to a jury trial
under the MHRA.26 The plaintiff asked the Southern District Court of Appeals
to prohibit the trial judge from striking his jury demand.27 The appellate court
had to decide whether the plaintiff had a statutory or constitutional right to a jury
trial on his MHRA claim.
The Tolbert court determined that the Missouri General Assembly did not
create a statutory right to jury trial on MHRA claims.28 Under a predecessor
statute to the current MHRA, 29 an employee dissatisfied with a ruling by the
Missouri Human Rights Commission (MHRC) on an employment discrimination
complaint was entitled to a trial de novo in circuit court "by a jury, upon written
request therefor filed before the trial date."30 In 1965, the Missouri General
Assembly eliminated the right to a de novo jury trial.3' In 1986, the legislature32
repealed Chapter 296, and replaced it with Chapter 213, the current MHRA.
Under the plain language of Chapter 213, the Missouri General Assembly made

22. Mo.REV. STAT. § 213.111.1 (1994) (emphasis added).
23. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.111.2 (1994) (emphasis added).

24. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeny, 828 S.W.2d 929, 929-32 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); Pickett v. Emerson Elec. Co., 830 S.W.2d 459,459-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(adopting the Tolbert analysis).
25. 828 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

26. Id. at 929-30.
27. Id. at 929.
28. Id. at 930-32.
29. Mo. REv. STAT. § 296.010 (1978) (repealed 1986). This anti-discrimination
statute provided employees with an administrative remedy for discrimination issued by
the MHRC and reviewed by a circuit court, de novo, but did not provide direct access to
state court. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 296.030, 296.040, 296.050 (1978) (repealed 1986);
Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 931 (discussing the legislative history of the MHRA).

30. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 296.010-.296.070 (1978) (repealed 1996); Tolbert, 828
S.W.2d at 931.
31. Mo.REV. STAT. § 296.050 (1978) (repealed 1996); Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 931.
32. See Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 931.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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no mention of a right to jury trial on MHRA claims. 3 3 In 1989, the legislature
proposed to amend Section 213.111 by adding the following sentence: "Such
action shall be tried before a jury if one is requested by either party." Governor
Ashcroft vetoed the proposed amendment.35 The legislative history and plain
language of the MHRA persuaded the Tolbert court that the legislature knew
how to create the right to jury trial, but intentionally did not do so in Chapter
213.36

The Tolbert court further determined that the Missouri Constitution does
not guaranty the right to jury trial on MHRA claims. 37 The Missouri
Constitution, adopted in 1945, holds inviolate the right to jury trial "as heretofore
enjoyed."3' The plaintiff in Tolbert sought as relief actual and punitive damages
only, not equitable relief, and argued that a plaintiff claiming legal damages had
a right to jury trial at common law that cannot be statutorily extinguished.39 The
court ruled that MHRA claims are not common law claims, and Chapter 213 was
enacted after the adoption of Missouri's 1945 Constitution; therefore, the
plaintiff had no right to jury trial that was "heretofore enjoyed." Moreover, the
MHRA's primary remedies are equitable,4' and the damages remedies available
under the MHRA are merely incidental to the MHRA's equitable thrust to
eliminate unlawful discrimination.42 Accordingly, MHRA plaintiffs have no
constitutional right to a jury trial under the Missouri Constitution.43
The very thorough analysis and holding in Tolbert establishes a critical
point: the Missouri General Assembly, without infringing on any constitutional
rights, required that judges, not juries, determine MHRA liability, and the extent
of damages flowing from that liability.
2. The Right to Uncapped Damages Under the MHRA
Courts interpreting the MHRA naturally emphasize its provision for
uncapped compensatory and punitive damages when damage awards exceed the
federal caps." However, the same courts do not discuss when the Missouri

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. See also supranote 18 and accompanying text.
Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 931.
Id.
Id. at 931-32.
Id. at 934-35.
38. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
39. Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 929-30.

40. Id. at 933.
41. For example, the right to secure injunctive relief and recover back pay. See

Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111(2) (1994).
42. Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 934.
43. Id. at 934-35.
44. See, e.g., Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 575-76 (8th Cir.
1997) (clarifying that $50,000,000 punitive damages award was rendered under the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/2
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General Assembly provided for uncapped damages under the MHRA, which is
important to understand the MHRA's balance. Before 1986, the MHRC
determined what relief MHIRA claimants deserved, subject to judicial review.'
MHRA claimants had no direct access to state courts, and the MHRA did not
provide for punitive damages." In 1986, the Missouri General Assembly
enacted the current MHRA, including Section 213.111. 47 At the same time that
the Missouri General Assembly provided MHRA claimants access to the
judiciary, the legislature provided for uncapped damages, but required that such
damages be determined by ajudge, not ajury. In 1986, the legislature increased
the stakes under the MHRA, but not without balance.
III. ADJUDICATION OF MHiRA CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURTS:

THE BALANCES COME INTO CONFLICT
A. Overview
The foregoing analysis of the balance between the right to a jury trial and
the presence of uncapped damages under the MHRA was largely irrelevant until
Congress passed federal laws substantively enlarging the scope of a plaintiffs
rights under federal law.48 In 1991, Congress created the right to jury trial for
claimants seeking compensatory and punitive damages under federal antidiscrimination statutes,49 but simultaneously capped recoverable compensatory

and punitive damages to anywhere between $50,000 and $300,000, depending
on the size of the employer.50 Congress created a balance.
Under federal law, a jury may assess liability, but its ability to assess
damages for intentional conduct is severely restricted. Federal juries may award
no more than $300,000 to discrimination plaintiffs for compensatory and
punitive damages, and that latitude depends upon the size of the employerdefendant.5 Congress thus created a balance directly converse to that created by
the Missouri General Assembly in the MHRA: juries may find liability and
MHRA because the MHRA has no cap on punitive damages, while Title VII caps
compensatory damages at a maximum of $300,000); Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1062 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming $400,000 damages award under
MHRA claim).
45. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 296.010-.296.070 (1978) (repealed 1986).
46. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 296.010-296.070 (1978) (repealed 1986).
47. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.137 (1994).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a (1994).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(c) (1994).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (1994).
51. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 1997).
(recognizing that jury's $50,000,000 punitive damages award, which was reduced to

$5,000,000 by the trial court, could not have been awarded under Title VII because such
liability was capped under federal law).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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award damages, but they do not have unbridled discretion over the amount of
such damages.
How, then, do verdicts like the Kimzey verdict arise in federal jury trials in
the State of Missouri? The answer to this question lies in an examination of the
power federal courts have over the right to jury trial on state law claims in
federal courts, including MIRA claims.
Plaintiffs with clains under federal anti-discrimination statutes and pendent
MHRA claims use the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute" to bring MHRA
claims in federal court. Once in federal court, plaintiffs routinely demand a jury
trial on all of their claims, including MIHRA claims. 53 Despite the fact that no
right to a jury trial exists on MHRA claims in Missouri state courts, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that MHRA plaintiffs are entitled to jury
trial in federal courts.54 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit toppled the inherent
balance created by the Missouri General Assembly in the MHRA.
B. How Plaintiffs Secure a Jury Trial on MHRA Claims
1. Supplemental Jurisdiction: The Procedural Path
for MHRA Claims in Federal Court
Plaintiffs use the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute55 to bring their
MHRA claims in federal court. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction
of "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States., 5 6 Federal anti-discrimination statutes are quite clearly "laws of the
United States," so federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil
actions arising under these laws. The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.57

52. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
53. See Waldermeyer v. ITr Consumer Fin. Corp., 767 F. Supp. 989, 994-95 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) (granting the plaintiff's request for a jury trial on claims under the MHRA and
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
54. See Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F. 3d 225 (8th Cir. 1996). For a further
discussion of Gipson, see notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).

56. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/2
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Under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, federal courts shall exercise
jurisdiction to entertain state claims of a Title VII plaintiff, for example, so long
as the state claims "form part of the same case or controversy" as the federal
discrimination claims.$' M}HRA and Title VII claims based on the same alleged
discriminatory conduct are logically part of the "same case or controversy."
Accordingly, federal courts routinely entertain MHRA claims.
The practical effect of the supplemental jurisdiction statute in a
discrimination lawsuit is that any plaintiff with the foresight to administratively
pursue violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes and the MHRA may
bring his MHRA claim in federal court. 9
2. The Right to Jury Trial on MHRA Claims in Federal Court:
Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co.
By bringing MI-RA claims in federal court, plaintiffs gain the right to ajury
trial on these claims, despite the Missouri General Assembly's intent. This
anomaly is the result of Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co.6
In Gipson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Missouri
courts do not allow jury trials of MHRA claims. 6' However, whether the right
to ajury trial exists in federal court is another matter entirely.62 "[T]he right to
a jury trial in federal court is a question of federal law, even when the federal

58. See, e.g., Canada v. Thomas, 915 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (W.D. Mo. 1996)
(discussing plaintiffs state law claims after federal civil rights claims were dismissed).
59. Federal courts may, in their discretion, decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law MHRA claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994). In U.S. Financial
Corp. v. Warfield, 839 F. Supp. 684 (D. Ariz. 1993), the court refused to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state statutory claim that was specifically restricted to
the state courts of Arizona. Employers facing MHRA claims in federal court can make
an even more compelling case that federal courts in Missouri should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over MHRA claims than the defendant in Warfield. Like the
statute at issue in Warfield, the MHRA restricts a claimant's access to state circuit courts.
See Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.111(1) (1994) ("[S]uch an action may be brought in any
circuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to
have occurred, either before a circuit or associate circuit judge."). In addition, for the
reasons articulated in this Article, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over MHRA
claims upsets the "uncapped damages, but no jury trial" balance created by the Missouri
General Assembly. See supranotes 15-47 and accompanying text. There is, however,
no reported case law reaching a conclusion similar to Warfield for claims brought under
the MHRA.
60. 83 F.3d 225 (8th Cir. 1996).
61. Id. at 230 (citing State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d 929, 930-35
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
62. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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court is enforcing state-created rights and obligations, indeed, even when a state
statute or state constitution would preclude a jury trial in state court. '63
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution preserves the
right to jury trial in federal court for plaintiffs seeking damages, even if those
damages "are merely 'incidental' to equitable relief.' " Further, "[t]he Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial extends to statutory causes of action, so long as the
statute allows, and the plaintiff seeks, at least in part a legal remedy., 61 Within
this framework, the Gipson court held that because the MHRA authorizes
recovery of damages, even though merely incidental to equitable remedies,
MHRA plaintiffs have the right to a jury trial on MHRA claims in federal
court.66

After Gipson, the right to ajury trial for MHRA claims in federal courts is
fairly secure. Interestingly, the anomaly created by the supplemental jurisdiction
statute and Gipson creates a direct conflict between the intent of Congress and
that of the Missouri General Assembly, as manifested in federal and state antidiscrimination statutes. But the legislative policy of neither is served by this
anomaly. Congress permits ajury to assess liability, but not beyond the damages
caps of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Under Gipson, juries can assess damages well in
excess of Congress' caps. The Missouri General Assembly permits a MHRA
claimant to recover potentially unlimited damages, based on ajudge's discretion.
Under Gipson, juries, not judges, will assess uncapped MHRA damages.
IV. RESTORING BALANCE TO THE MHRA:
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
A. Overview
The Missouri General Assembly could avoid the disruption of balance in
MHRA claims litigated in federal court by taking the drastic measure of
abandoning the MHRA's balance altogether. First, the legislature could amend

63. Id. (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39
(1958); Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931)).
64. Id. (quoting Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,470 (1962)).
65. Id. at 231 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)).
66. Id. See also Sullivan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 808 F. Supp. 1420, 1424
(E.D. Mo. 1992); Steward v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 230, 231 (E.D. Mo.
1988).
The Gipson decision has implications stretching far beyond the right to jury trial
on MHRA claims in federal court, and beyond the scope of this Article. It can certainly
be argued that under Gipson, a state legislature can never effectively require ajudge to
assess damages under a statutory cause of action, so long as the plaintiff can find a way
into federal court. For example, under Gipson, do plaintiffs alleging state statutory
consumer protection violations have the right to a jury trial on such claims if they can
satisfy diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/2
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the MHRA by creating the right to a jury trial on MHRA claims; however, this
would place employers at risk of completely unreasonable damages verdicts, like
the Kimzey verdict. Second, the legislature could amend the MHRA by capping
damages commensurate with the damages caps in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; however,
this would strip plaintiffs who truly deserve more than the applicable cap amount
of their ability to secure an appropriate verdict.
The purpose of this Part of the Article is to demonstrate that the Missouri
General Assembly need not abandon the delicate balance it created in the
MERA; it can restore and preserve that balance. State legislatures use various
schemes to implement their anti-discrimination policies, and many have created
common-sensical statutory provisions to protect the unique balance of their
schemes. By borrowing ideas from other Missouri statutes and from antidiscrimination laws of other states, the Missouri General Assembly can protect
the unique balance inherent in the MHRA.
In overview, the legislature should: (1) create an adjudicative hearing
division of the MHRC;67 (2) require MHRA claimants to litigate their claims
before an administrative judge in the MHRC hearing division;6' (3) require
claimants who have potential MHRA and federal anti-discrimination statutory
claims to either administratively pursue their MHRA claims, or pursue their
federal claims in federal court;69 and (4) create a framework for adjudication of
MIIRA claims before the MHRC hearing division, including the right to limited
appeal in circuit courts." This can be fairly accomplished without eliminating
or reducing the remedies available under the MHRA, and without violating the
Missouri Constitution.
B. The Proposal:A Modified Approach to MHRA Adjudication
1. Background: How Do Other States Adjudicate
State Employment Discrimination Claims?
Different states take different approaches in implementing how claimants
may seek relief under their respective anti-discrimination laws. Some states
require claimants to use commissions like the MHRC to seek relief for them
administratively, and provide access to state courts for administrative appeals
only.7 Other states do not provide for administrative proceedings to secure
relief under their anti-discrimination laws, and require claimants to seek relief
through the courts only.7" In short, legislative mechanisms to secure relief

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See infranotes 86-88 and accompanying text.
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001-44-1044 (1993).
72. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01-14-02.4-21 (1997).
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provided by state statutes are critical components of a legislature's overall
strategy to eliminate unlawful employment discrimination.
Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act,73 for instance, if Minnesota's
equivalent of the MIIRC does not complete its investigation within 180 days
after an aggrieved party files an administrative complaint, the aggrieved party
can institute a trial-type hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 4 In
addition to equitable relief, the ALJ can award the aggrieved party compensatory
damages capped at three times the amount of actual damages, and punitive
damages not to exceed $8500." 5 Alternatively, the aggrieved party can elect to
sue under the state anti-discrimination statute in state court, without the right to
a jury trial.76 In Minnesota, while the Gipson-supplemental jurisdiction
phenomenon could sweep such civil actions before a jury in federal court, the
aggrieved employee could not recover more than the capped damages noted
above.' The Minnesota scheme has balance, with no risk that a jury will assess
uncapped damages.
Similar to the Minnesota legislature, the Utah legislature has created a
"Division of Adjudication" within its equivalent of the MHRC to
administratively adjudicate employment discrimination claims. 7' The judge in
these hearings has broad power to "provide relief to the complaining party,
including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs. 79
Unlike the Minnesota legislature, however, the Utah legislature did not provide
aggrieved parties with direct access to courts. To avoid having state claims
which are intended to be administratively adjudicated from being raised before
a jury in federal court, and to deter aggrieved parties from contemporaneously
pursuing federal claims in federal court and state claims in an administrative
proceeding, the Utah anti-discrimination law provides as follows: "The
commencement of an action under federal law for relief based upon any act
prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of any
adjudicative proceeding before the commission in connection with the same
claims under this chapter."'
The Utah scheme preserves the legislature's
contemplated balance by providing administrative trial-type proceedings leading
to potentially broad remedial orders, and blocking access to federal juries.
Finally, under the Maine Human Rights Act, the Maine legislature
authorized an aggrieved party to file suit in state court to seek the relief allowed

73. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-363.15 (West 1997).
74. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071 (West 1997).
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071 (West 1997).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.14 (West 1997).
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.14 (West 1997).
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107 (1997).
79. UTAH CODEANN. § 34A-5-107(a) (1997).
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107(16) (1997).
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under Maine's anti-discrimination statute.8' The Maine statute provides for the
same equitable relief and capped compensatory and punitive damages
contemplated by federal law,82 and the right to a jury trial in state court,83 but
also provides for a civil penalty payable to an aggrieved party up to $50,000.
Accordingly, the Maine legislature created a different anti-discrimination policy
than Congress created. To avoid friction between its legislative strategy and that
of Congress, the Maine legislature provided that claimants seeking relief under
federal law and Maine's anti-discrimination statute can only recover under
Maine law if the claimants' federal claims fail.y
All of the above legislative schemes share one common denominator-the
legislatures created anti-discrimination plans different than Congress' plan, and
then created safeguards to preserve the inherent interests sought to be balanced
by those statutory schemes.
2. Amending the MHRA to Preserve
the Intent of the Missouri General Assembly
The Missouri General Assembly clearly intended to have experienced fact
finders (i.e., judges) determine MHRA liability and the potentially uncapped
damages flowing from MHRA liability. By borrowing from existing Missouri
statutes and other state anti-discrimination statutes, the legislature can protect its
intent from the Gipson-supplemental jurisdiction anomaly. The Missouri
General Assembly should retain its uncapped damages provision, but require
MHRA claimants to litigate their claims before an experienced ALJ without
direct access to state courts. This can easily be accomplished as follows:
a. Create a Hearing Division of the MHRC
First, the Missouri General Assembly should create a separate hearing
division of the MHRC, much like the administrative adjudication divisions in
Minnesota and Utah.86 The legislature could use the Administrative Hearing
Commission under Chapter 621 of the Missouri Revised Statutes as a model to
create a formal hearing division of the MHRC.87 For example, Section 213.020
of the MHRA can be amended by adding the following paragraph, by reference
to Chapter 621:

81.
82.
83.
84.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4613(1) (West Supp. 1997).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(B)(8)(e) (West Supp. 1997).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 5, § 4613(2)(b)(8)(g) (West Supp. 1997).

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4613.2.B(7) (West 1997).

85. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4613.2.B(8)(A) (West 1997).

86. See supranotes 73-80 and accompanying text.
87. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 621.015-621.205 (1994).
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There is hereby created a "Human Rights Hearing Division" of the
commission. It shall consist of no more than three hearing commissioners.
The hearing commissioners shall be appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the senate. The term of each hearing commissioner
shall be for six years and until his successor is appointed, qualified and sworn.
The hearing commissioners shall be attorneys at law admitted to practice
before the supreme court of Missouri, but shall not practice law during the
term of office. Each hearing commissioner shall receive annual compensation
of fifty-one thousand dollars plus any salary adjustment provided pursuant to
section 105.005, RSMo. Each hearing commissioner shall also be entitled to
actual and necessary expenses in the performance of his duties.88
This amendment would create a body of ALJs, experienced fact finders, to
adjudicate MHRA claims currently adjudicated in court.
b. Direct Cases to the Hearing Division
Second, the legislature should amend Section 213.111 of the MHRA to
direct litigants to the hearing division of the MHRC, not to circuit courts. For
example, that section of the MHRA could be amended as follows:
1. If, after one hundred eighty days from the filing of a complaint alleging
discriminatory practice, the commission has not completed its administrative
processing and the person aggrieved so requests in writing, the commission
shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter indicating his right
to institute a contested administrative hearing, on the record, before the
hearing division of the commission. Upon issuance of this notice, all
proceedings relating to the complaint before the commission, other than the
contested administrative hearing before the hearing division, shall terminate.
No person may file or reinstate a complaint with the commission after the
issuance of a notice under this section relating to the same practice or act.
Any action brought in the'hearing division of the commission shall be filed
within ninety days from the date of the commission's notification letter to the
individual but no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred or its
reasonable discovery by the alleged injured party.
2. The hearing division may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any
permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other
order, and may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, and may
award costs to bring the contested hearing and reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party, other than a state agency or commission or a local
commission; except that a prevailing respondent may be awarded costs and
reasonable attorney fees only upon a showing that the case is without
foundation. 9

88. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 621.015 (1994).
89. See Mo.REV. STAT. § 213.111 (1994).
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By keeping MHRA plaintiffs within the administrative framework, the
legislature would prevent plaintiffs from using the Gipson-supplemental
jurisdiction anomaly to avoid its requirement that juries shall not assess
uncapped damages under the MHRA. At the same time, the legislature would
retain the same remedies MIIRA claimants currently seek in courts, including
uncapped compensatory and punitive damages.
c. Require an Election of Remedies
Third, the legislature should preclude alleged victims of employment
discrimination from seeking relief in two separate adjudicative proceedings
arising out of the same wrong: one before the MHRC hearing division under the
MHRA, and another in federal court under federal anti-discrimination statutes.
Following the guidance of the Utah legislature, the Missouri General Assembly
could add a third paragraph to Section 213.111 of the MHRA that states:
3. The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based upon
any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of
any adjudicative proceeding before the hearing division in connection with
the same claims under this chapter.'
This amendment guarantees that the very different balances of the MHRA
and federal anti-discrimination statutes remain distinct. Plaintiffs will make a
choice: (1) seek uncapped damages under the MHRA, without the jury wildcard;
or (2) bring their claims before a jury in federal court, without the uncapped
damages wildcard. This amendment also promotes efficiency. Plaintiffs will not
be able to simultaneously pursue two separate proceedings arising out of the
same wrong.
d. Implement Contested Case Procedures
Fourth, and finally, the legislature should create a procedural framework for
adjudication of MHRA claims before the MHRC hearing division, including the
right to limited appeal in circuit courts. Such a framework for contested
administrative hearings already exists in Missouri under Chapter 536 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes.9' The Missouri General Assembly simply could
require the hearing division of the MHRC to comply with Missouri's
adjudicative administrative procedures by adding a fourth paragraph to Section
213.111 of the MI-RA:

90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107(16) (1997).
91. Chapter 536 sets forth statutory procedure and review requirements for
administrative hearings. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.010-536.215 (1994).
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4. Proceedings before the hearing division of the commission shall be
instituted and adjudicated as provided by the contested case procedures of
chapter 536 RSMo., and any party aggrieved by a final decision of the hearing
division shall be entitled to judicial review thereof, as provided by chapter
536 RSMo.
The provisions of Chapter 536 provide for a trial-type procedure in a
contested case before an administrative agency,92 much like a trial before a
circuit or associate circuit judge, as contemplated by the MHRA.93 In addition,
cross-referencing the limited judicial review provisions of Chapter 536, as
opposed to de novo review of administrative rulings, will streamline final
adjudication of MHRA claims.
C. Net Effect ofthe LegislativeProposal
By establishing a board of ALJs within the MHRC, the Missouri General
Assembly would create a panel of judges with expertise in determining MHRA
liability and damages. By forcing plaintiffs either to administratively pursue a
potentially uncapped damages award under the MHRA, or pursue a jury trial
with capped damages under federal anti-discrimination statutes, the Missouri
General Assembly would prevent friction between its unique plan and Congress'
plan. The net effect of the proposal is that through the MHRC hearing division,
the Missouri General Assembly can efficiently restore the balance it intended to
create in state courts, without interference. Thus, the Missouri General
Assembly can protect Missouri's anti-discrimination policy.
D. ConstitutionalCriticism of the Proposal
RequiringAdministrative Adjudication
Requiring MHRA claimants to adjudicate their claims before a hearing
division of the MHRC, instead of in court, presents no constitutional dilemma.
Critics of the above legislative proposal might argue that by allowing an
administrative agency to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
assess damages against an employer, all historically judicial functions, the
proposal violates the separation of powers provision of the Missouri
Constitution.94 This criticism is invalid.

92. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.010 (1994).
93. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.111(1) (1994).
94. Mo. CONST., art. II, § 1, states as follows:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments-the legislative, executive and judicial-each of which shall be
confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons,
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the
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According to the Missouri Supreme Court, the purpose of the separation of
powers provision is "to keep the several departments of our state government
separate and independent in the spheres allotted to each," not to totally separate
the three branches of government." "Within this framework, delegation of
administrative and decisional authority to executive agencies is not only
possible, but desirable. The complexities of a modem government, economy and
technology, as well as the need for expertise, continuity and monitoring,
necessarily demand delegation to such bodies."96
An agency's performance of adjudicative functions does not violate the
Missouri Constitution, provided the agency's final decision is "subject to direct
'
review by the courts."97
The legislative proposal set forth in this Article provides
for judicial review of the MHRC's hearing division decisions, pursuant to
Chapter 536 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 98 In Percy Kent Bag Co. v.
Missouri Commission,99 the Missouri Supreme Court held that such judicial
review is sufficient to uphold the quasi-judicial determinations of the MIHRC,
including administrative awards of back pay and compensatory damages."'
Perhaps more importantly than providing an avenue of judicial review, the
proposal does not in any way seek to preclude judicial review, which would
render the proposal unconstitutional.'
In suggesting that ALJs with expertise in MHRA matters should determine
MHRA liability, subject to limited review by the circuit courts of Missouri, this
proposal not only restores the balance created by the Missouri General Assembly
in the MHRA, it is constitutionally sound.

others, except in instances in this constitution expressly directed or
prohibited.
95. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Mo. 1993) (quoting Rhodes v.
Bell, 130 S.W. 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910)).
96. Id. at 200 (citing State Tax Comm'n v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 641
S.W.2d 69, 74 (Mo. 1982)).
97. Id. (citing Mo. CONST. art. V, § 18; In re St. Joseph Lead Co., 352 S.W.2d 656,
659-60 (Mo. 1961); St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 S.W.2d 95,
101 (Mo. 1946); Wood v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 197 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. 1946);
Farmer's Bank v. Kostman, 577 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Harris v. Pine
Cleaners, 274 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954), aff'd, 296 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1956)).
98. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
99. 632 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1982).
100. Id. at 485.
101. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200-02 (Mo. 1993) (finding statute
precluding judicial review of final agency decision unconstitutional because separation
of powers requires direct judicial review of such decisions).
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V. CONCLUSION

Right now, the MHRA is not working the way it was meant to work. The
anomaly manifested in the Kimzey verdict need not, however, be set in stone.
The prospect of federal juries awarding unlimited damages under the MHRA
was never meant to be, and it has upset the delicate balance inherent within the
MHRA. The above proposal is one way to restore that balance.
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